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ARTICLES
Secret Justice and the Adversary System
Frank Askin*
Introduction
For years, The Trial, by Franz Kafka, has served as the literary
model for totalitarian justice. Kafka's protagonist, Joseph K., stumbles
through a nightmarish judicial proceeding in a shadowy forum without
ever discovering the nature of the charges against him or the evidence
upon which they are based. In a passage that probably best explains the
derivation of the adjective "Kafkaesque" for all types of secret and unfair
adjudications, the author explains that in this particular court
the proceedings were not only kept secret from the general public,
but from the accused as well.... For even the accused had no
access to the Court records, and to guess from the course of an
interrogation what documents the Court had up its sleeve was very
difficult.1
Some recent judicial decisions in our own federal courts suggest that
Kafka-like adjudication is not as foreign as one might expect or wish
under a legal system dedicated to implementing due process of law.
This Article questions the compatibility of such adjudicatory proce-
dures with American constitutional traditions. Part I discusses some re-
cent decisions upholding the authority of federal courts to resolve
contested issues of fact in favor of government agencies on the basis of
secret evidence. Part II examines the modem derivation of the govern-
ment privilege claim in civil litigation. Part III analyzes three different
methods federal courts have devised to deal with legal disputes following
a determination that relevant information is protected by government
privilege. Part IV examines the doctriie of adversariness and its central-
ity to the notion of due process of law. Part V traces the increasing invo-
* Professor of Law, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey School of Law, New-
ark; General Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union. J.D., Rutgers Law School, 1966; B.A.,
City College of New York, 1966. The author was counsel of record in Patterson v. FBI,
discussed herein.
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cation of national security claims during the Cold War era, and discusses
the special threat posed to the adversary system when courts are too def-
erential to such claims. Part VI questions whether in camera examina-
tion of privileged material by a judge alone provides sufficient protection
for the rights of litigants against the government. Part VII proposes a
mechanism for protecting information whose release would indeed harm
national security interests without sacrificing the rights of litigants to the
adversarial hearing that due process would normally guarantee them. A
concluding section raises fundamental questions about the politics of na-
tional security in the post-Cold War era and the continuing need to ele-
vate national security concerns over the demands of adversary justice.
I. Creeping Kafkaism
The first case clearly to hold that a federal court could reach a deci-
sion as to disputed facts on the basis of evidence not shared with the
opposing party is Molerio v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,2 decided by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.3
Molerio was a discrimination suit by a rejected applicant for a job with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The applicant claimed that
he was rejected due to the political associations of his father.4 The FBI
refused to provide the plaintiff with his application file, but turned it over
to the court in camera.5 The court not only held the file privileged and
not subject to discovery, but found as a fact that material in the file
proved the defendant had a legitimate reason other than the alleged polit-
ical discrimination for its action on the plaintiff's application.6
The appellate court conceded that the plaintiff "had made a circum-
stantial case permitting the inference that his father's political activities
were a '"substantial factor"-or, to put it in other words, . . . a "moti-
vating factor" ' in the failure to hire."7 The court went on to state, how-
2. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
3. The district court held "first, that without the privileged information the plaintiff had
not made out a prima facie case; and second, that even if he had, the suit would have to be
dismissed because the defendants were unable to present their defense on the record." Id. at
819-20.
4. Id. at 819.
5. When opinions refer to in camera proceedings, it is not always clear whether those
proceedings are also exparte, although the context generally indicates that they are. On occa-
sion, courts have permitted adversarial participation in in camera proceedings. See United
States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 667 F.2d 1105, 1107-08 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1144 (1982); see infira notes 173, 181-86 and accompanying text.
6. Molerio, 749 F.2d at 825.
7. Id. (citing Mt. Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
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ever, that as a result of its in camera inspection of the documents in
connection with its verification of the privilege claim, it
knows that the reason Daniel Molerio was not hired had nothing
to do with [his father's] assertion of First Amendment rights.
Although there may be enough circumstantial evidence to permit a
jury to come to that erroneous conclusion, it would be a mockery
of justice for the court-knowing the erroneousness-to partici-
pate in that exercise .... [W]e know that further activity in this
case would involve an attempt, however well intentioned, to con-
vince the jury of a falsehood.8
The opinion by Judge (now Justice) Antonin Scalia cited no authority for
its far-reaching and extraordinary determination that a court of law,
under our adversary system, could resolve a disputed issue of fact on the
basis of secret evidence.
A subsequent District of Columbia Court of Appeals opinion ap-
provingly cites Molerio in dicta. In re United States9 concerned a manda-
mus petition by the government, which sought dismissal of a law suit
against the FBI on the ground that privileged documents would prove
the plaintiff's claim was groundless. The case of Albertson v. Department
of Justice,"0 which gave rise to this mandamus proceeding, alleged
particularly outrageous conduct by the FBI, which was then operating
pursuant to its greatly discredited counterintelligence programs (CO-
INTELPROs).II FBI documents discovered pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) 2 revealed that the FBI had planted fictitious
papers to convince Communist Party officials that one of its leaders, Wil-
liam Albertson, was an FBI informant. As a result, Albertson was ex-
pelled from the Party, and according to the suit brought by his widow,
Albertson also lost his health, his job at a Party bookshop, and most of
his friends. 3
The government argued that matters at the core of plaintiff's claims
and the government's defenses constituted secrets of state that would be
jeopardized if the case continued."4 The appellate court was uncon-
vinced, however, that "evidence of the Government's activities of twenty
8. Id.
9. 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 398 (1989).
10. CA No. 84-02034 (D.D.C. filed July 1984).
11. See generally K. O'REILLY, HOOVER AND THE UN-AMERICANS 198-207 (1983)
(describing FBI activities under various COINTELPROs).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
13. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 474; see Lewis, Abroad at Home: Rule of Law?, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 26, 1989, at A27, col. 1 (reporting settlement of the case prior to the Supreme
Court's ruling on the petition for certiorari).
14. In re United States, 872 F.2d at 474.
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to thirty years ago will result in the disclosure of state secrets today.""
The court also remained unconvinced that "the district court would be
unable to 'disentangle' the sensitive from the nonsensitive information as
the case unfolds."16 Although the appellate court denied the govern-
ment's petition and remanded for further proceedings, the court agreed
that "summary judgment against the plaintiff is proper if the district
court decides that the privileged information, if available to the defend-
ant, would establish a valid defense to the claim."1 7
A recent Third Circuit case also follows Molerio. In Patterson v.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 8 a teenaged plaintiff sued the FBI under
the Federal Privacy Act 19 for interference with his correspondence with
foreign governments. A precocious youth, he had started at age eleven to
compile his own personal world encyclopedia. His efforts included a
steady stream of correspondence with embassies and information bureaus
of Communist-ruled countries. Several years after an FBI agent visited
the house to inquire about the suspicious correspondence, the family re-
quested the child's file under FOIA.2° They were told the file was ex-
empt from disclosure because of national security considerations.2
Litigation ensued. The complaint sought access under FOIA to all docu-
ments, and relief under the United States Constitution for illegal mail
tampering22 and under the Federal Privacy Act for illegal maintenance
of a file on plaintiff's first amendment activities.23 The government sub-
mitted an affidavit to justify actious that on their face appeared to violate
provisions of the Privacy Act. After reviewing the affidavit in camera,
the district court granted the government's motion for summary judg-
ment as to all counts of plaintiff's complaint. The court's opinion con-
ceded that the public record contained genuine issues of material fact
which normally would have precluded summary judgment, but held that
the secret affidavit had satisfied the court that the government's action
15. Id. at 479.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 476.
18. 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990), aff'g 705 F. Supp. 1033 (D.NJ. 1989).
19. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. 1985).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. 1985).
21. Patterson, 705 F. Supp. at 1037.
22. Id. at 1038; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
24. Patterson, 705 F. Supp. at 1044-45. The Federal Privacy Act states that agencies of
the federal government may "maintain no record describing how any individual exercises
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the
individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of
an authorized law enforcement activity." 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1982 & Supp. 1985).
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was justified.25
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressed sympathy with plain-
tiff's "objections to the anomalous situation of having to defend against a
motion for summary judgment without being privy to the very docu-
ments necessary for such a defense," 26 and noted that the "'lack of
knowledge by the party seeing [sic] disclosure seriously distorts the tradi-
tional adversary nature of our legal system's form of dispute resolu-
tion.' ,,27 "[N]otwithstanding this imbalance between the parties,"
however, the court proceeded to adopt what it termed the view of "the
D.C. Circuit, as well as other circuits [that] have allowed the use of in
camera affidavits in national security cases."' 28 Examining the same ex
25. Patterson, 705 F. Supp. at 1044. The district court resolved two separate and distinct
factual issues on the basis of the government's in camera submissions. The first concerned the
plaintiff's Privacy Act claim that the FBI was maintaining records describing his exercise of
first amendment rights, and that they were not "pertinent to and within the scope of an author-
ized law enforcement activity." The court acknowledged the existence of genuine issues of fact
in the public record and then proceeded to resolve them on the basis of the exparte evidence as
follows:
Because the FBI had not made an adequate showing of the relevance of records
maintained on plaintiff's exercise of First Amendment rights to an authorized law
enforcement activity, the Court ordered the FBI to submit an in camera affidavit
which would further attempt to demonstrate the required relevance. The FBI subse-
quently submitted the Greer Affidavit to serve this purpose. Upon review of the
Greer Affidavit, the Court now finds that records maintained by the FBI on plain-
tiff's exercise of First Amendment Rights are relevant to an authorized law enforce-
ment activity of the FBI and that the continued maintenance of such records does
not violate any provision of the Privacy Act.
Patterson, 705 F. Supp. at 1044.
Plaintiff also alleged unlawful interference with his mail. Again, the district court re-
solved the factual issues on the basis of the government's ex parte submissions:
After reviewing the record as a whole, including in camera inspection of the withheld
documents and the Greer Affidavit, the Court finds, as a matter of fact, that the FBI
and any FBI or other government employees involved in activities concerning plain-
tiff acted in accord with all applicable statutory and regulatory guidelines.
Id. at 1045.
26. Patterson, 893 F.2d at 600.
27. Id. (quoting Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415
U.S. 977 (1974)).
28. Id. at 600 n.9. The doctrine and authorities cited in footnote 9 and its accompanying
text are in fact quite confused and garbled. The court is dealing, at that point in the opinion,
with plaintiff's quite separate FOIA claims, which concededly are traditionally decided on the
basis of in camera examination of the documents that are being requested. See infra notes 91-
93 and accompanying text. Of the four cases cited in support, only Molerio v. Federal Bureau
of Investigation, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984), concerns the use of ex parte evidence to re-
solve a disputed issue of fact. Hayden v. National Sec. Agency, 608 F.2d 1381 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980), is a traditional FOIA case. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985), is a typical privilege case in which the suppression of
privileged information leaves the plaintiff unable to establish a prima facie claim. See infra
notes 46-60 and accompanying text. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983), is a decision on an issue of law concerning the interpretation of
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parte material relied upon by the trial court, the appellate court was per-
suaded that the FBI had acceptably demonstrated that its behavior did
not violate any provision of the Privacy Act and there were no remaining
issues of material fact to resolve.29
Molerio,30 In re United States,31 and Patterson3 2 illustrate the will-
ingness of federal courts to resolve contested issues of fact in favor of the
government on the basis of evidence concealed from the opposing
party.33 These cases raise the question of the propriety of courts (which
are bound by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution)
resorting to Kafkaesque procedures to dismiss a plaintiff's claim when
they believe disclosure of relevant evidence would harm national
interests.
II. The Judicial Examination of Claims of Government
Privilege: United States v. Reynolds
Federal courts recognize a common-law privilege for certain types
of sensitive government information. In United States v. Reynolds,3 4 the
Supreme Court held that a government privilege against revealing mili-
tary and state secrets was "well established in the law of evidence." 3
the Privacy Act. It leaves open the possibility of substantive consideration of an in camera
affidavit on remand, but there is no clear holding on the point.
29. Patterson, 893 F.2d at 603. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the illegal mail tampering claim on an alternative ground that did not require application of
the Molerio principle. The court held, more in line with traditional privilege law, that because
the FBI could not be compelled to reveal the identity of the "John Doe" defendant who had
intercepted plaintiff's mail and because a suit may not be maintained in federal court against a
fictitious party, plaintiff could not establish that the district court had in personam jurisdiction;
therefore the suit must be dismissed. Id at 604.
30. Molerio v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
31. 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 110 S. Ct. 398 (1989).
32. 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990), affig 705 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989).
33. Most recently, the Eighth Circuit has endorsed the doctrine. See Wabun-Inini v. Ses-
sions, 900 F.2d 1234 (1990) (civil suit against the FBI for alleged violation of the plaintiff's
fourth amendment right to be free from an unwarranted and unreasonable seizure of his prop-
erty). In upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants, the
appeals court approved the trial court's ex parte, in camera examination of an FBI submission
that explained the reasonable basis for the FBI's conduct. The FBI had contended that public
disclosure of the reasons for its action would have impeded a law enforcement investigation,
and the appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by its disposi-
tion of the case. Id. at 1247.
34. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). The pre-Reynolds judicial history of the state secret privilege is
traced in M. HALPERIN & D. HOFFMAN, FREEDOM VS. NATIONAL SECURITY (1977); see also
Note, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: Protection for the National Security or Immu-
nity for the Executive?, 91 YALE L.J. 570 (1982); Note, Developments in the Law: The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1130, 1220-23 (1972).
35. 345 U.S. at 6-7 (footnotes omitted).
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The Court further held that the privilege is not to be lightly invoked.
"There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal con-
sideration by that officer."
3 6
Reynolds was a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act37 brought by
the survivors of three civilians killed in the crash of a military airplane
that was testing secret electronic equipment. Plaintiffs moved for pro-
duction of the official accident report and other documents containing
statements taken in connection with the official investigation of the
crash. 38 The Secretary of the Air Force, objecting to production of the
documents on the ground that the plane was engaged in a highly secret
mission, filed a formal claim of privilege. The district court demanded
that the government turn over the disputed documents for in camera
inspection and, when the Secretary refused, entered an order in accord-
ance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 39 that the facts on the
issue of negligence be taken as established in the plaintiffs' favor.' The
ruling was affirmed by the court of appeals.41
In upholding the claim of privilege, the Supreme Court established a
balancing test that required weighing the necessity of the information to
the claimant against the government's need to keep the information se-
cret.42 The Court resolved the immediate dispute in favor of the govern-
ment because it found that the plaintiffs' needs could probably have been
satisfied by accepting the government's offer to make the surviving crew
members available for examination. 3 Because an available alternative
existed that might have provided them with the evidence they were seek-
ing, plaintiffs' claim of need was considered "dubious" and they could
not insist on "forcing a showdown on the claim of privilege."'  The
Court, however, in dicta that has been dear to the hearts of government
attorneys ever since, declared that "even the most compelling necessity
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately satisfied
36. Id. at 7-8.
37. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346, 2674 (West 1952).
38. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(i), now FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
40. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 5.
41. Reynolds v. Bramer, 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951).
42. Id. at 11.
43. Id.
44. Id. Reynolds actually involved two levels of privilege: (1) withholding the documents
from the plaintiff; and (2) examination of the documents by the judge, over the government's
objection, in the first instance. As to both issues, the Supreme Court held that it was up to the
judiciary, not the executive branch, to decide. Under the circumstances in Reynolds, the
Supreme Court held that the lower court could uphold the privilege without examining the
documents themselves.
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that military secrets are at stake."
45
III. The Consequences of a Determination of Privilege
Once a court has determined that a privilege exists,4 6 there are three
possible methods of proceeding. The traditional method is merely to re-
move the information or documents from the case. When a court up-
holds a claim of privilege invoked by a party resisting the discovery
requests of an adversary, the respondent is protected from having to re-
veal the disputed information and the discovering party loses its potential
benefit.
47
The second method applies when a criminal defendant claims that
the privileged data is necessary for his or her defense. Congress, by
adopting the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),4 8 created a
special procedure that may force the government to choose between per-
mitting disclosure of the information or dropping prosecution of a case.
CIPA was adopted by Congress in 1980 to combat the problem of
"graymail"-the threat by a government agent to reveal classified infor-
mation unless the government refrained from prosecution. The purpose
of the Act is to establish a procedure to determine whether a defendant's
claim of exculpatory material is indeed genuine.49 If the court so deter-
mines after an in camera examination, the government must choose be-
tween disclosing the information or dropping the case. This principle
had been expounded thirty-six years earlier by Judge Learned Hand in
United States v. Andolschek,5° which concerned not national security in-
formation, but information the disclosure of which might jeopardize an
ongoing criminal investigation:
So far as [privileged documents] directly touch the criminal deal-
ings, the prosecution necessarily ends any confidential character
the documents may possess; it must be conducted in the open, and
45. Id.
46. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
47. See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985); Farnsworth
Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980); D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FED-
ERAL EVIDENCE 1059-65 (1985).
48. Pub. L. No. 96-456, reprinted in 18 U.S.C. app. § 348 (1989); see United States v.
Pringle, 751 F.2d 419, 425-28 (1st Cir. 1984).
49. The Attorney General's certification that a public proceeding may result in the disclo-
sure of classified information requires an in camera hearing to determine if the information will
in fact jeopardize national security interests. At the government's request, the court may, in its
discretion, substitute a generic description of the information if it has not previously been
revealed, or a statement admitting relevant facts, or a summary of the classification. See Sal-
gado, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information Procedures Act, 98 YALE
L.J. 427 (1988).
50. 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
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will lay bare the subject matter. The government must choose;
either it must leave the transactions in the obscurity from which a
trial will draw them, or it must expose them fully.51
The Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in Jencks v. United
States, 52 holding that the "burden is the Government's ...to decide
whether the public prejudice of allowing the crime to go unpunished is
greater than that attendant upon the possible disclosure of state secrets
and other confidential information in the Government's possession.""
That holding was subsequently codified by Congress in the Jencks Act.54
The procedure followed in Molerio v. Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion55 and Patterson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,56 and approved in
dicta in In re United States,57 provides a third alternative: allow the gov-
ernment to use information that it keeps from its adversary as a sword to
establish a fact upon which it has the burden of producing evidence.58
51. Id. at 506.
52. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
53. Id. at 672. Upon discovering, during cross-examination of two undercover infor-
mants, that information relevant to defendant's case was regularly recorded by the FBI, de-
fense counsel moved for production of the records and was denied. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the defendant was entitled to inspect all written reports touching upon
events and activities testified to at trial. The trial court could not rule on the materiality of the
documents without first allowing the defense to examine them.
One commentator has suggested that the result should be the same whenever the govern-
ment initiates the action, whether in its law enforcement or in its proprietary capacity. Zagel,
The State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875, 906 (1966). See the opinion of Judge Simon
Rifkind in Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), suggesting that
the government as civil plaintiff stood in the same shoes as the criminal prosecutor in being
required to disclose privileged evidence or refrain from suit. Id. at 803. Judge Rifkind then
added: "It is a somewhat longer step to the conclusion that the privilege is surrendered when
the government is a party defendant." Id. at 804.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988). The Jencks Act addresses information that is obtained
through trial testimony. CIPA requires notification prior to trial that a party may disclose
classified information.
A similar adverse consequence may be imposed on an unresponsive litigant when a fifth
amendment self-incrimination claim is cited as the reason for withholding relevant information
from the litigation. In such cases, the court may impose a reasonable sanction on the with-
holding party, such as drawing an adverse inference. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308,
318 (1976) ("[Ihe prevailing rule [is] that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse infer-
ences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evi-
dence offered against them: the Amendment 'does not preclude the inference where the
privilege is claimed by a party to a civil cause.' ") (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 439
(McNaughton rev. 1961)).
55. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
56. 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990), a.ffg 705 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989).
57. 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 398 (1989).
58. Prior to Molerio, there were several First Circuit decisions setting aside summary
judgments granted by lower courts that had relied upon privileged material. The First Circuit
restricted the material on which a court may rely for such a judgment to material that "would
be admissible in evidence," citing, inter alia, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Association
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One must consider not only the consequences of a determination of
privilege, but also the procedure that must be followed in deciding
whether or not a privilege exists. Two options are permitted by Reyn-
olds: a judge may decide the issue based on extrinsic evidence alone, or
after an in camera, ex parte inspection of the confidential documents. A
third option is an in camera, adversary examination under protective or-
der.59 Although few reported cases actually permit opposing counsel to
review documents at a hearing to determine privilege vel non, such a pro-
cedure is arguably within the acknowledged discretion of the court.'
IV. Adversary Justice and Its Exceptions
The adversarial system is central to the American notion of due pro-
cess. Justice Alan Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court cogently
stated this principle:
An unmentioned premise of our adversary system is that the truth
takes sides. Because we do not know which side truth has taken,
we let the sides fight it out.... The premise of the modem adver-
sary system is that an impartial fact finder, be it jury or judge, will
reach the correct determination in weighing the evidence that has
been presented to it by the advocates of each adversary party, who
are dedicated solely to presenting their client's position in the best
possible light. In this contest, the truth will out.
6 1
for Reduction of Violence v. Hall, 734 F.2d 63, 67 (5th Cir. 1984) (reversing summary judg-
ment because "the district court apparently relied on documents which it had previously deter-
mined to be privileged"). In Bane v. Spencer, 393 F.2d 108, 109 (lst Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 866 (1970), the court stated:
The district court, after personally examining the medical records, did not pass on
plaintiff's motion to release them, but in granting summary judgment stated that
there was nothing in them of aid to the plaintiff. Assuming the district court to be
correct, the defendant should not be able to use the records as a sword to seek sum-
mary judgment and at the same time blind plaintiff so he cannot counter. Defend-
ant's affidavit must contain on its face, for plaintiff to see, whatever defendant wishes
to rely upon to seek summary judgment.
Concededly, these cases did not involve information alleged to affect national security. A
subsequent decision by the district court in Massachusetts applied the principle enunciated in
Hall and Bane to a case involving material privileged for reasons of national security. Allende
v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220, 1226 (D. Mass. 1985) ("[IThe very nature of the adversary sys-
tem demands that both parties be given full access to any information which may form the
basis for a judgment.").
59. See infra notes 173-93 and accompanying text.
60. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. Lyon, 567 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 918 (1978); cf United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 567 F.2d 121, 133-34 (D.C. Cir.
1977). But see United States v. Pringle, 751 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that defendant
and his counsel could be excluded from an in camera CIPA hearing).
61. Handler, The Judicial Pursuit of Knowledge" Truth and/or Justice, 41 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1, 4 (1988); see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1951)
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An early epistemological rationale was supplied by John Stuart Mill:
Since there are few mental attributes more rare than that judicial
facility which can sit in intelligent judgment between two sides of a
question, of which only one is represented by an advocate before it,
truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every
opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds
advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.62
The United States Supreme Court has frequently emphasized the
need for adversarial confrontation as part of the truth-finding process in
order to minimize the risk of error. In setting aside the centuries-old
common-law practice of permitting prehearing attachments of property
in certain kinds of cases, the Supreme Court declared in Fuentes v.
Shevin, "[N]o better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth
than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it."
63
Carroll v. Princess Anne" contains an even more pointed explication
of the need for adversarial confrontation: "The value of a judicial pro-
ceeding.., is substantially diluted where the process is ex parte, because
the Court does not have available the fundamental instrument for judi-
cial judgment: an adversary proceeding in which both parties may
participate." 65
Relying on such principles, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has
considered on several occasions grants of summary judgment by trial
courts that had taken into consideration privileged material not available
to the opposing party. Association for Reduction of Violence v. Hall66 was
a civil rights action by prison inmates who claimed they had been the
victims of retaliatory transfers for the exercise of rights protected by the
First Amendment. 67 The trial judge acknowledged, in granting sum-
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); S. LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE
AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION (1988).
62. J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 301 (M. Ler-
ener ed. 1961).
63. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 81 (1972) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (citing Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 170-72).
64. 393 U.S. 175 (1968) (precluding the issuance of temporary restraining orders on the
basis of ex parte proceedings).
65. Id. at 183-84; cf Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 873 (1966) ("In our adversary
system for determining guilt or innocence, it is rarely justifiable for the prosecution to have
exclusive access to a storehouse of relevant fact."); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia
Press, 266 U.S. 285, 288 (1924) ("The words 'due process of law', when applied to judicial
proceedings,... require a proceeding which .... whenever it is necessary for the protection of
the parties, gives them an opportunity to be heard respecting the justice of the judgment
sought.").
66. 734 F.2d 63 (1st Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 64.
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mary judgment to the defendants, that he had reviewed documents
which he had earlier ruled privileged and exempt from discovery by
plaintiffs following an in camera examination. 6' The appeals court re-
versed, holding, inter alia, that Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, governing summary judgments, precluded consideration of
material other than material "'that would be admissible in evidence or
otherwise usable at triaL' . . . Material that does not come within the
above broad category should not be considered."'69 The court empha-
sized that in camera inspections should be "conducted solely to deter-
mine discoverability and not 'for the purpose of making any ex parte
determination on the merits.' "70 The court also relied on an earlier Cir-
cuit opinion by a panel that included two members of the Association for
Reduction of Violence v. Hall1 panel, Judges Coffin and Aldrich.72
In addition, the court cited Kinoy v. Mitchell,73 in which the govern-
ment made a claim of national security privilege. The government had
submitted in camera exhibits in connection with a motion for summary
judgment, and had requested the court to determine whether certain
electronic surveillance concerned foreign rather than domestic security
and might thereby obviate the warrant requirement held applicable to
domestic security investigations by the Supreme Court.74 Judge Con-
stance Baker Motley of the Southern District of New York stated: "Our
system of justice does not encompass ex parte determinations on the mer-
its of cases in civil litigation. [If] the documents are privileged [then] the
litigation must continue as best it can without them... .,75 Judge Mot-
ley also stated:
Simultaneously,. . . the Government presents the Court, in cam-
era, with material which it asserts must be withheld from plaintiffs
as privileged, yet which it requests the Court to consider in ascer-
taining material facts and drawing legal conclusions concerning
dispositive issues in the case. In this Court's view such a course is
wholly unacceptable.
76
In Allende v. Schultz,7 7 the Massachusetts District Court followed
Hall and held that the government could not justify its denial of a visa to
68. Id. at 65.
69. Id. at 67 (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 56).
70. Id. (quoting Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 489 (E.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982)).
71. 734 F.2d 63 (1st Cir. 1968).
72. See Bane v. Spencer, 393 F.2d 108 (Ist Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 866 (1970).
73. 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
74. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
75. 67 F.R.D. at 15.
76. Id.
77. 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Mass. 1985).
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an allegedly undesirable alien on the basis of privileged information. The
court denied the government's motion for summary judgment, which
was supported by in camera submissions, declaring that the decision was
made "without prejudice to its renewal if defendants can produce unclas-
sified material establishing, as a matter of public record, a 'facially legiti-
mate and bona fide' reason for their refusal to grant Mrs. Allende a
visa.
, ,Ts
Justice Frankfurter has noted that the right to an adversary contest
over the facts serves the additional goal of legitimizing the legal process
by assuring the losing party that the rules of the game were fair:
"[Validity and moral authority of a conclusion largely depend on the
mode by which it was reached.... No better.., way [has] been found
for generating the feeling, so important to a popular government, that
justice has been done."
'79
Subsequent to Molerio v. Federal Bureau of Investigation,80 the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals revisited the question of secret justice
in a visa application case reminiscent of Allende. In Abourezk v. Rea-
gan," a panel majority consisting of Judges Ruth Ginsburg and Harry
Edwards, with Judge Bork dissenting, invoked the traditional principles
of adversariness discussed above:
It is a hallmark of our adversary system that we safeguard party
access to the evidence tendered in support of a requested coirt
judgment. The openness of judicial proceedings serves to preserve
both the appearance and the reality of fairness in the adjudications
of United States courts. It is therefore the firmly held rule that a
court may not dispose of the merits of a case on the basis of ex
parte, in camera submissions.2
The court set forth the traditional procedure for examining claims of
privilege, authorizing the trial court to examine the evidence "in camera
and alone for the limited purpose of determining whether the asserted
privilege is genuinely applicable."83 Should the court uphold the privi-
lege, the opinion emphasized, "then the court may not rely upon the
information in reaching its judgment."84
The requirements of adversariness are not without some limited ex-
78. Id. at 1226-27.
79. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
80. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
81. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affld, 484 U.S. 1 (1987).
82. Id. at 1060-61.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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ceptions, however, as the majority in Abourezk acknowledged. 5 The
most traditional exception is when one party seeks to prevent use of ma-
terial in litigation by asserting an evidentiary privilege.8 6 In such a situa-
tion, the proponent of the privilege claim must perforce be "free to
request in camera review to establish the fact" of the privilege." To do
otherwise would negate the privilege in the act of its assertion.88 The
opponent of the privilege claim may also have the right to request in
camera review if there is extrinsic evidence that the material itself might
demonstrate the inapplicability of the privilege claim.89 The court's au-
thority in such cases, however, is limited to determining admissibility of
the disputed evidence. The court may not utilize the disputed evidence
in the determination of the underlying dispute.
An extensive body of law concerning in camera review has devel-
oped in the context of FOIA litigation. Although it is true that as a
consequence of such ex parte proceedings the court is authorized to de-
finitively decide contested issues,9" the only substantive issue addressed
in such cases is the plaintiff's right of access to the disputed documents.
As such, FOIA cases are sui generis. They reflect the fact that FOIA
grants a statutory right to information contained in government files,
limited by built-in exemptions for certain kinds of public documents. 91
To require a full adversary proceeding in such cases would destroy one
purpose of the legislation-to limit public only access to those docu-
ments not privileged. 92
85. Id.
86. See supra notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
87. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 569 (1989) (lawyer-client privilege).
88. "If a petitioner were permitted to participate in the debate on discoverability, he could
in essence win before he loses. He might ascertain the desired information, even if the court
later denied formal disclosure." In re Eisenberg, 654 F.2d 1107, 1112 (5th Cir. 1981).
89. See Zolin, 491 U.S. at 568-69.
90. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(B) (West 1977); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
91. See, ag., Stein v. Department of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1981); Weinberger v.
Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981) (FOIA restriction
trumps right granted by the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969).
92. Even in FOIA litigation, at least one federal judge has challenged the use of ex parte
proceedings to determine privilege claims. In Military Audit Project v. Bush, 418 F. Supp. 876
(D.D.C. 1976), Judge Gerhard Gesell commented:
[A] Federal Judge can be placed in an untenable position which ignores fundamental
considerations of due process. Should the Court choose to proceed in camera in its
discretion, the citizen is denied access to the papers and as a practical matter neither
he nor his counsel have any opportunity to question the factual grounds on which
exemption is sought....
Is it not alien to our entire jurisprudence that courts are to function ex parte in
private without benefit of the adversary process? Will it not degrade the judiciary if
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After discussing this traditional exception to the adversariness rule,
Judge Ginsburg's Abourezk opinion acknowledged the Circuit Court's
prior opinion in Molerio93 as the "one case in point" standing for an
additional exception: "Only in the most extraordinary circumstances
does our precedent countenance court reliance upon ex parte evidence to
decide the merits of a dispute." 94 This Article poses the question of what
would constitute such "extraordinary circumstances" (which generally
arise in the context of alleged threats to national security), and how the
interests of justice can be best served when they are present.95
V. The "National Security" Trap
In the nuclear age and the era of the Cold War it was unavoidable
that litigation over claims of government secrecy would proliferate, and
that inevitability is reflected in numerous decisions in the federal report-
ers over the past several decades dealing with issues of classified govern-
ment information and/or the rights of employees in jobs designated by
the government as sensitive.96 As early as 1973, it had already been esti-
mated that the executive branch's inventory of classified documents al-
ready exceeded one billion and that up to one hundred million new
documents were being classified each year.97 Without question, there is
some information that the government must be able to shield in the inter-
est of national security. The most committed first amendment advocate
it is used as a mechanism for resolving statutory rights on the basis of undisclosed
representations made in chambers to judges by parties having a direct personal inter-
est in the outcome? Surely our whole jurisprudence since the Magna Carta and the
abolition of Star Chamber proceedings requires that the judiciary in both fact and
appearance remain neutral, independent of Executive or legislative influence. The
adversary system is a well-tested safeguard for preserving the integrity of the judicial
process. It is the duty of a judge wherever possible to resolve the rights of citizens
upon facts and arguments that are presented in an adversary context exposed to pub-
lic view with all the protections fair hearing and due process provide.
Id. at 878.
93. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
94. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added), afl'd,
484 U.S. 1 (1987); accord Naji v. Nelson, 113 F.R.D. 548, 552 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
95. It is true that the cases requiring adversary participation often include dicta sug-
gesting that special rules may govern when national security information is involved. See Den-
nis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 875 (1966); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 670
(1957) ("It is unquestionably true that the protection of vital national interests may militate
against public disclosure of documents in the Government's possession.").
96. See, eg., Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988); Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592 (1988); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507
(1980); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon Papers case);
Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956).
97. See Dunn, Judging Secrets, 31 VILL. L. REv. 471, 472-73 (1986).
760 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 18:745
must concede that even the strong presumption against prior restraints
must be tempered to permit protection of information concerning troop
movements in time of war.9" Even those who conclude from recent expe-
rience that government claims of imminent danger to the national secur-
ity are as reliable as those of the proverbial shepherd boy99 must concede
that there are occasions when the wolves do attack the sheep. The ques-
tion is how should we go about determining when the wolves really are at
hand, and how may constitutional values best be protected even when
they are at hand.
The current judicial tendency to give wide deference to government
national security claims when they come into conflict with constitutional
values"°° is unjustified by the realities of governmental operations. Bu-
reaucrats will almost always opt for secrecy.1 °1 Even if government offi-
cials have the utmost confidence in the propriety and wisdom of their
stewardship of public affairs, total openness can only provide ammuni-
tion for their critics and political opponents. Since they have the unilat-
eral ability to publicize only those actions and documents that reflect
favorably upon themselves, bureaucratic claims of privilege should of ne-
cessity be viewed with some amount of skepticism. The preeminent first
amendment scholar Professor Thomas Emerson commented a few years
ago:
The secrecy attached to many national security issues allows the
government to invoke national security claims in order to cover up
embarrassment, incompetence, corruption or outright violation of
law. And subsequent events almost always demonstrate that the
asserted dangers to national security have been grossly exagger-
ated. To put it another way, when national security claims are
advanced, there may well be a confusion of the interests of the ad-
98. See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726 (Brennan, J., concurring) (Pentagon Papers
case).
99. See generally Dunn, supra note 97.
100. See Egan, 484 U.S. 518; Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985);
Agee, 453 U.S. 280; Snepp, 444 U.S. 507; Knopf v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1063 (1972); see also Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts and National Secur-
ity Information, 103 HARV. L. REV. 906 (1990); Comment, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished
Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409 (1986).
101. For a recent discussion and citation of authorities illustrating "the executive branch's
proclivity for excessive secrecy," see Note, A Handyman's Guide to Fixing National Security
Leaks: An Analytical Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb Unauthorized Publication of
Classified Information, 5 J.L. & POL. 759, 768-70 (1989). See also Kaiser, The Amount of
Classified Information: Causes, Consequences, and Correctives of a Growing Concern, 6 GOV'T
INFO. Q. 247, 252-54 (1989).
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ministration in power with the interests of the nation.102
Less caustic, but equally skeptical, was the observation of former Solici-
tor General Erwin Griswold, the advocate of the government's state
secrets claim in the Pentagon Papers case:
10 3
It quickly became apparent to anyone who has considerable experi-
ence with classified material that there is massive overclassification
and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national
security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of one sort
or another .... [T]here is very rarely any real risk to current na-
tional security from the publication of facts relating to transactions
in the past, even the fairly recent past. This is the lesson of the
Pentagon Papers experience."~
Particularly instructive in this regard was the concurring opinion of Jus-
tice White in the Pentagon Papers case. Despite his opposition to prior
restraint of information, Justice White confidently predicted that "revela-
tion of these documents will do substantial damage to public inter-
ests." 10 5 History confirms, as both Emerson and Griswold noted, that
his concerns were unfounded and his reliance on constitutional principle
justified.
One of the few members of the Supreme Court who has taken an
unequivocal position against prior restraints was Justice Douglas, who
commented in the Pentagon Papers case, "The dominant purpose of the
First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmen-
tal suppression of embarrassing information.... Secrecy in government
is fundamentally -anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. ' I16
In recent years, exaggerated claims of national security and/or exec-
utive privilege have been invoked in an effort to conceal the Watergate
102. Emerson, National Security and Civil Liberties, in THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND NA-
TIONAL SECURrrY 84-85 (1984). A 1985 congressional staff report came to a similar conclu-
sion: "All too often, documents are classified to protect politically embarrassing information
or to hide government misconduct." SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AND SUBCOMM. ON CIVIL SERVICE, COMM. ON POST OFFICE
AND CIVIL SERVICE, PRELIMINARY JOINT STAFF STUDY ON THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL
SECRETS, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, PROTECTING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: A COMPILATION AND INDEX OF
MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1985-1987 (1985).
103. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
104. Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping; The Courts and Classified Information, Wash.
Post, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25, col. 3. It is noteworthy that 18 years earlier, Dean Griswold's
brief warned the Court that publication of the "Pentagon Papers" would pose a "grave and
immediate danger to the security of the United States." LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGU-
MENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 127 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds.
1975) (quoted in Fisher, Congressional-Executive Struggles Over Information: Secrecy Pledges,
42 ADMIN. L. REV. 89, 107 (1990)).
105. 403 U.S. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
106. Id. at 723-24 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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break-in,1"7 the burglary at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, °8
conduct during the war in Vietnam and the bombing of Cambodia, " the
wiretapping of radical domestic political organizations, 01 the sale of
arms to the Ayatollah, ' and the diversion of the proceeds of the Iran
arms sale to the Nicaraguan Contras. '11 It took this author five years of
strenuous litigation of a state secrets claim, including an appeal to the
Circuit court and a change in trial judges, to obtain from the FBI a docu-
ment revealing that the reason it had conducted a mail cover at the na-
tional offices of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was that the SWP was
actively involved in protest activities against the war in Vietnam.
1 13
In one of the more egregious recent invocations of the state secrets
privilege, the Department of Justice aborted the prosecution of former
CIA official Joseph Fernandez on Iran-Contra related charges by refus-
ing to permit release, under CIPA, of documents that would reveal infor-
mation about CIA facilities in Central America previously disclosed but
not officially confirmed by the government. The Independent Counsel
appointed to prosecute the case referred to the alleged secrets at stake as
"fictional."11 4
107. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C. 1974).
109. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
110. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
111. Safire, This Bud's For You, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1988, at A19, col. 5.
112. See infra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the aborted Fernandez
prosecution).
113. Paton v. La Prade, 469 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1978). The FBI's mail cover application
included the following in its detailed justification:
SWP has been able to bring its message to large numbers of American citizens by
virtue of its control and domination of the National Peace Action Coalition and the
Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam .... These organiza-
tions are in the forefront among antiwar groups in the United States. These activities
offer the SWP a major role in planning, promoting and executing antiwar demonstra-
tions, some of which have in the past created violence.
Id. at 775.
114. Johnston, Case Dismissed in Iran-Contra Affair, Clearing Agent, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25,
1989, at 1, col. 1. Fernandez provides a unique application of the government-secrets problem
because the Department of Justice, a political ally of defendant Fernandez, controlled the
CIPA decision, while the actual prosecution of the case was in the hands of the Independent
Counsel. The case also demonstrates the frailty of national security claims that are not subject
to adversarial challenge. In Fernandez, adversarial confrontation was provided by the In-
dependent Counsel, who also had access to the allegedly sensitive information. He commented
as follows on the Attorney General's claim of privilege:
The supporting affidavits of the intelligence officials in Fernandez are based
largely on speculation about the effect that public acknowledgement of CIA stations
might have on intelligence-gathering capabilities. None of these assessments of risk
are supported by hard data about the state of affairs in the countries at issue, about
the sources of potential risk, or about the measures that could be taken to compen-
sate for these risks.
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The substantial record of abuse of the state secrets privilege by the
federal government signals a need for rigorous testing of such claims in
the courts. Unfortunately, the more recent record of the federal judiciary
suggests this power has been exercised mainly in the breach,11 and indi-
cates that unless the Reynolds '16 doctrine is modified, constitutional
rights will be unnecessarily sacrificed in the name of national security." 7
VI. Must We Trust the Judiciary?
It is apparently the view of courts that have adopted the Molerio"8
position that the neutral and impartial judge will adequately protect the
rights of the litigant who is denied access to decisive evidence. In Patter-
son v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9 the Court of Appeals self-con-
sciously acknowledged the plaintiff's "anomalous situation of having to
defend against a motion for summary judgment without being privy to
the very documents necessary for such a defense." 12 "However, the
remedy for the unfairness," the court decided, "is an in camera examina-
tion by the trial court of the withheld documents and any supporting or
explanatory affidavits."'' The court then went to pains to assure the
plaintiff that "[o]n the basis of our in camera review of the documents we
have no hesitation in stating that there is nothing derogatory in them
regarding [the plaintiff] or any member of his family."' 22
Assuming it is reasonable to hold that in suits between private par-
ties the judge is a neutral third force, does the same hold true in litigation
between a citizen and the government accused of violating that citizen's
rights? It would seem more appropriate to totalitarian regimes to compel
a citizen to rely totally and exclusively upon the protection and largesse
of one branch of government in disputes with another. Justice White
reasoned in Duncan v. Louisiana:
123
Those who wrote our [federal and state] constitutions knew from
history and experience that it was necessary to protect against...
L. Walsh, Second Interim Report to Congress by Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Mat-
ters 2 (Dec. 11, 1989).
115. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
116. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
117. For another critique of the use of perceived threats to national security to undermine
constitutional values and structures, see Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liber-
alism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989).
118. 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
119. 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990), aftg 705 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989).
120. Id. at 600.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 601 n.10.
123. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers
of the constitutions strove to create an independent judiciary but
insisted upon further protection against arbitrary action.... mIhe
jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluc-
tance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citi-
zen to one judge or to a group of judges.' 24
While much of the concern of the Founders over "the compliant,
biased, or eccentric judge"'125 focused on protecting the criminally ac-
cused, that concern is probably even more applicable to cases involving
suits against the law enforcement arm of government by a citizen suffer-
ing injury as a result of the government's investigative activities.
Whereas the stake of the government in any single criminal prosecution
is quite limited, its stake is quite high where government officers are be-
ing actively prosecuted by private parties for official wrongdoing. Nor in
this era of highly politicized federal judicial appointments is it improp-
erly disparaging of a district judge under consideration for elevation to a
higher court to suggest that he or she might not be totally and absolutely
disinterested when asked to rule in such a dispute.
Aside from any possible personal stake, there is no reason to assume
that because an individual has achieved a position on the federal bench,
he or she is a totally impartial and unbiased observer in the kinds of
value-laden litigation that are usually attendant when claims of state
secrets are invoked. As Justice Brennan observed, "[J]udges are human
beings whose judgment necessarily reflects the press of human events." 
126
More importantly, apart from the possibility of conscious or uncon-
scious bias, a judge is seldom in a position to provide effective representa-
tion to the absent party in an in camera review. Even the most
conscientious judge is unlikely to be as cognizant of the subtle nuances of
law and fact as the advocate-lawyer. Small clues that might be of highly
significant evidentiary value to an advocate immersed in the facts and
litigation strategy of a case may be wasted on a "neutral" judge, espe-
cially when the proponent of the privileged material has unchallenged
access to the judge's eyes and thought processes to lead them in whatever
direction desired. Especially in cases against public officials based on
novel legal theories, such as those discussed in Part I,127 significant items
hidden within pages of "privileged" documents might be overlooked.
124. Id. at 156.
125. Id.
126. Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law," 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 3, 6
(1988).
127. See supra notes 18-23.
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This point was made by Justice White in his opinion for the Court in
Alderman v. United States,128 which concerned a criminal defendant's
right of access to wiretap logs to determine whether the prosecution's
case might have been tainted by illegally acquired evidence. The Court
rejected the government's claim that in camera review of the logs by the
judge would be adequate to protect the defendant's rights:
Adversary proceedings are a major aspect of our system of crimi-
nal justice. Their superiority as a means for attaining justice in a
given case is nowhere more evident than in those cases, such as the
ones at bar, where an issue must be decided on the basis of a large
volume of factual materials, and after consideration of the many
and subtle interrelationships which may exist among the facts re-
flected by these records. As the need for adversary inquiry is in-
creased by the complexity of the issues presented for adjudication,
and by the consequent inadequacy of ex parte procedures as a
means for their accurate resolution, the displacement of well-in-
formed advocacy necessarily becomes less justifiable. 29
The Court emphasized the need for such an adversary proceeding in or-
der to reduce the incidence of error "by guarding against the possibility
that the trial judge, through lack of time or unfamiliarity with the infor-
mation contained in and suggested by the materials, will be unable to
provide the scrutiny" that the law demands. 130 The significance of Alder-
man for the present discussion is heightened because Alderman entailed
charges of espionage, and thus the Court was dealing with alleged na-
128. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
129. Id. at 183-84. The scope of Alderman was restricted in Taglianetti v. United States,
394 U.S. 316 (1969) (per curiam), in which the Court held:
Nothing in [Alderman] requires an adversary proceeding and full disclosure for reso-
lution of every issue raised by an electronic surveillance. On the contrary, an adver-
sary proceeding and disclosure were required in those cases, not for lack of
confidence in the integrity of government counsel or the trial judge, but only because
the in camera procedures at issue there would have been an inadequate means to
safeguard a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.... Under the circumstances
presented here, we cannot hold that "the task is too complex, and the margin for
error too great, to rely wholly on the in camera judgment of the trial court."
Id. at 317-18 (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit adopted similar reasoning, focusing on the
relative simplicity of the factual issue, to distinguish Alderman in Trujillo v. Sullivan, 815 F.2d
597, 616 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 929 (1987). See also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480
U.S. 39 (1987) (reversing a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to permit counsel for
an accused child molester to search the prosecution's files in a hunt for exculpatory informa-
tion). Acknowledging that its ruling would deny the defendant "the benefits of an 'advocate's
eye,'" the court declared that "an in camera review by the trial court will serve [defendant's]
interest without destroying the Commonwealth's need to protect the confidentiality of those
involved in child-abuse investigations." Id. at 60-61. Neither the majority nor the dissent
cited Alderman.
130. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 184.
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tional security information.
1 3 1
Alderman was consistent with a case decided two years earlier, Den-
nis v. United States,'32 which considered the right of defense counsel to
examine prior grand jury testimony of several prosecution witnesses for
possible impeachment purposes. The Court observed, "In our adversary
system, it is enough for judges to judge. The determination of what may
be useful to the defense can properly and effectively be made only by an
advocate."'1
33
While Alderman, Jencks, and Dennis persuasively argue that the
judge cannot adequately perform the advocacy role of the lawyer, later
cases seem to have all but forgotten their teachings.' 34 The drift from the
requirement of adversarial confrontation was challenged by Justices
Marshall and Brennan, in 1974, in a dissent from the denial of a writ of
certiorari.1 35 The case concerned the denial to a defendant in a tax pros-
ecution of access to an investigation report prepared by an Internal Reve-
nue Service agent in connection with his trial testimony. The Court of
Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to the report under the
Jencks Act, 36 but went on to examine the report itself and determined
that "[it] would have been of no assistance to defendant" and, therefore,
failure to produce it was harmless error.1 37 Justice Marshall asserted
that the decision was inconsistent with Alderman, Dennis, and Jencks.
According to Justice Marshall, the Jencks Act, which Congress had
adopted in response to the case for which it was named, "makes clear
that it is not ordinarily part of the business of the federal judiciary to
determine whether the defense could effectively utilize a producible state-
131. In Alderman, possible concern for damage to the public interest by disclosure of the
privileged material to the defendant was minimized because "disclosure will be limited to the
transcripts of a defendant's own conversations and of those which took place on his premises,"
and it could therefore "be safely assumed that much of this he will already know." Id. at 184-
85. While Alderman did not involve documents that the government was proposing to use as
substantive evidence, it did involve the "derivative-evidence doctrine," which requires the gov-
ernment to prove that its illegal wiretapping did not taint the prosecution. See Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 344 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
133. Id. at 875 (emphasis added). The Dennis opinion also stated: "Trial judges ought not
to be burdened with the task or the responsibility of examining sometimes voluminous grand
jury testimony in order to ascertain inconsistencies with trial testimony." Id; see also Jencks
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668-69 (1957) ("Because only the defense is adequately
equipped to determine the effective use for [the] purpose of discrediting the Government's
witness and thereby furthering the accused's defense, the defense must initially be entitled to
see [the disputed documents] to determine what use may be made of them.").
134. See supra notes 2-33 and accompanying text.
135. Erckman v. United States, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
136. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988); see supra note 54 and accompanying text.
137. Erckman, 416 U.S. at 910 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ment." 138 He then reiterated the difficulty of a judge performing the role
of an advocate, which had been the rationale for those earlier decisions:
"A judge-especially an appellate judge whose only contact with a case
is through an examination of a cold record-simply does not have the
familiarity with the intimate details of a case necessary to make an ade-
quate determination of the full impeachment value of a witness' prior
statement." '139 The dissent quoted Alderman to the effect that adversari-
ness was essential in order to reduce the incidence of error" 'by guarding
against the possibility that the.., judge, through lack of time or unfamil-
iarity with the information contained in and suggested by the materials,
will be unable to provide the scrutiny... demand[ed].' ,"4 Justice Mar-
shall noted that in Alderman the Court had insisted on an adversary pro-
ceeding despite the national security interests at stake.141
The United States has long prided itself on the independence of its
federal judiciary. As the cited cases remind us, however, even independ-
ent judges cannot replace adversarial confrontation.
VH. A Modest Proposal
The first principle of constitutional law is that "[tjhe very essence of
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."142 The rhetoric
of Marbury v. Madison, however, fails to anticipate the reality of Reyn-
olds v. United States,143 which holds that "even the most compelling ne-
cessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is ultimately
satisfied that military secrets are at stake." 1"
Molerio145 and Patterson146 present the proverbial hard cases.147
They are at the intersection where the irresistible force (a prima facie
claim of violation of fundamental rights) meets the immovable object
(national security privilege). Under their holdings, a plaintiff may not
only be denied access to evidence needed in order to "claim the protec-
138. Id. at 912 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 914 (Marshall, ., with Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969)).
141. See Alderman, 394 U.S. at 184.
142. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
143. 345 U.S. 1 (1953); see supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
144. 345 U.S. at 11.
145. Molerio v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
146. Patterson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990), affg 705 F.
Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989).
147. See supra notes 2-8, 18-29 and accompanying text.
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tion of the laws,"' 48 but may also have his or her case dismissed because
the government defendant claims that secrecy is needed to protect na-
tional security.149 This Article suggests that there ought to be a means of
protecting genuine national security interests without sacrificing protec-
tion of fundamental rights."is
The earlier cases that appear to uphold claims of national security
over the right to an adversarial hearing are distinguishable from Molerio
and Patterson. Some are suits between private parties in which one party
seeks to use information protected by the state secrets privilege. Even in
such cases, dissenting voices protested against secret justice because rules
"for unexplicated imposition of arbitrary fiat . . . are potentially
frightening.'
15 1
Whether or not the federal government has an overriding interest in
the sanctity of its secrets when sought in aid of purely private litigation,
the government's claim is substantially weakened when it is itself the ac-
cused wrongdoer. This is especially true when the claimant asserts viola-
tion of a fundamental right and can present a prima facie case even
without resort to the government's material. 152 In such cases, plaintiff's
right to relief flows directly from the Constitution and is probably not
subject to defeasance unless Congress provides "another remedy, equally
148. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
149. Of course, the judge must examine the evidence and confirm the government defend-
ant's claim, but as pointed out supra Part V, the judge does not necessarily know all the rules
of the game, and, in addition, may not be completely impartial.
150. Similar concerns are voiced in Glennon, Publish & Perish: Congress' Effort to Snip
Snepp (Before and AFSA), 10 MICH. J. INT'L LAW 163, 175 (1989).
151. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 283 (4th Cir. 1980) (Murnaghan,
J., dissenting). A variety of solutions for resolving this problem in private litigation was of-
fered in Grimes, a civil suit for wrongful interference with contractual relations between plain-
tiff and the Department of the Navy. The district court dismissed the case because the plaintiff
was unable to establish a prima facie claim without the privileged evidence. Id. at 270. The
majority of the original hearing panel in the appeals court reversed on the ground that plaintiff
had established a prima facie case without the privileged material and suggested that upon
remand the parties waive a jury trial to permit an in camera trial and that the attorneys seek
security clearance from the government. Id. at 273, 276. After rehearing en bane, the panel
opinion was reversed and the case ordered dismissed because it was "evident that any attempt
on the part of the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case would so threaten disclosure of state
secrets that the overriding interest of the United States and the preservation of its state secrets
precludes any further attempt to pursue this litigation." Id. at 281. A dissent on behalf of
three members of the court urged a more flexible balancing formula, suggesting that the dis.
trict court be instructed to consider whether "the privilege so far obstructs normal proof in
respect of the issues presented by the parties as to deprive the litigation process of its essential
utility for fair resolution" of the issues, and whether the "danger of inadvertent compromise of
the protected state secrets outweigh[ed] the public and private interests in attempting formally
to resolve the dispute while honoring the privilege." Id. at 282 (Phillips, J., dissenting). Judge
Murnaghan wrote a separate dissent.
152. See Liuzzo v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
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effective."' 53 According to the teachings of Marbury, to deny such a
plaintiff the right to a remedy would constitute a denial of "the very
essence of civil liberty."' 1 4 It was upon this principle that the Supreme
Court founded the right of a direct cause of action under the Constitu-
tion for violation of rights by federal officials in Bivens.l'5
Courts have recognized the unfairness and impropriety of allowing
the government to prosecute a criminal defendant while withholding evi-
dence in order to protect national security.' 56 Is such government con-
duct any more acceptable when the plaintiff invokes the judicial process
to enforce a constitutional right, which Marbury says is the very essence
of civil liberty? 57 The Federal Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evi-
dence recognized this problem when it proposed evidence rules for the
federal courts. Proposed Rule 509(e) provided:
153. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 397 (1971). Although there is no clear holding to that effect, it is at least implied inBivens
dicta that Congress could not take away the right to sue in such situations without providing
an alternative remedy. More recently the Court has observed that a "'serious constitutional
question' ... would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a
colorable constitutional claim." Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (quoting Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986)). If, on the other
hand, the plaintiff's claim arises out of the government's proprietary activities for which the
government has waived its sovereign immunity-and, thus, "is a defendant only on terms to
which it has consented," Reynolds v. United States, 345 U.S. 1, 12 (1953)-it does not offend
notions of fair play and substantial justice to preclude plaintiff's suit. It exists only by grace of
the sovereign's waiver in the first place; and what the sovereign giveth, the sovereign may
taketh away. See United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 590 (1941).
154. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
155. 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971). Molerio v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 749 F.2d 815
(D.C. Cir. 1984), concerned a claim of direct violation of the First Amendment: the denial of
a job to plaintiff because of his father's political associations. Patterson v. Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990), afflg 705 F. Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989), concerned
privileged evidence going both to a Bivens-type claim and to a statutory claim under the Pri-
vacy Act. Even the statutory claim in Patterson, however, involved enforcement of a provision
of the Privacy Act specifically directed at the protection of fundamental rights provided by the
First Amendment. It is arguable that even in the absence of the Privacy Act, the government's
actions would constitute a direct violation of the First Amendment itself. See Paton v. La
Prade, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975); Elke, The Privacy Act of 1974, in PRIVACY LAW AND
PRAcTIcE 1 2.07[7] (1987). The Bivens-type claim in the Patterson case presents a somewhat
ambiguous version of the problem under consideration. On the one hand, the plaintiff did
assert a prima facie claim of government violation of his first amendment right to correspond,
which the district court resolved against plaintiff by deciding that the ex parte government
submissions proved the government had not violated his rights. On the other hand, the court
of appeals treated the issue as a typical privilege question in which denial of plaintiff's discov-
ery demand took the disputed material out of the case and left plaintiff unable to demonstrate a
prima facie case because he could not identify the proper defendant. See Salisbury v. United
States, 690 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
156. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
157. Several commentators have argued for parallel treatment of civil defendants when the
government institutes the action. See supra note 53.
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If a claim of privilege for a state secret is sustained in a proceeding
to which the government is a party and it appears that another
party is thereby deprived of material evidence, the judge shall
make any further orders which the interests of justice require, in-
cluding striking the testimony of a witness, declaring a mistrial,
finding against the government upon an issue as to which the evi-
dence is relevant, or dismissing the action.
The Advisory Committee noted the variety of situations in which
this rule might apply, but left ambiguous its intent regarding the rule's
application in cases such as those under discussion. The Committee did
acknowledge, however, that precedents "indicat[ed] unwillingness to al-
low the government's claim of privilege for secrets of state to be used as
an offensive weapon against it" when it related to an element of a plain-
tiff's claim against the government.
158
Proposed Rule 509(e) was not adopted by Congress, nor was any of
the rest of the detailed proposal for determining evidentiary privileges in
the federal courts. Congress instead adopted a bare-bones Rule 501,
which provides that privileges in the federal courts shall be determined
according to "the principles of the common law as they may be inter-
preted.., in the light of reason and experience." '159 The legislative his-
tory suggests that the proposed privilege rule was "extremely
controversial" and
[s]ince it was clear that no agreement was likely to be possible as to
the content of specific privilege rules, and since the inability to
agree threatened to forestall or prevent passage of an entire rules
package, the determination was made that the specific privilege
rules proposed by the Court should be eliminated and a single rule
(rule 501) substituted, leaving the law in its current condition to be
developed by the courts of the United States utilizing the principles
of the common law. 1"
Among the most vociferous critics of the proposed rule was the Depart-
ment of Justice, which protested that the drafters had substantially un-
dermined existing rules of government privilege. It is, therefore, of
substantial import that the Justice Department did not object to the pro-
posed consequences of a privilege finding set forth in Rule 509(e). 161
158. Proposed FED. R. EVID. 509 advisory committee's note, reprinted in 2 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 509-7 to -8 (1990).
159. FED. R. EvID. 501.
160. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP. No.
1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
161. See the proposed redraft of Rule 509 contained in a memorandum entitled "Depart-
ment of Justice Analysis and Recommendations Regarding Revised Draft of Proposed Rules
of Evidence for the U.S. Courts and Magistrates," which was enclosed with a letter from
Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst to Judge Albert Maxis, chairman of the Advisory Coin-
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Even though parts of the proposed rule engendered serious contro-
versy, there is authority that they provide guidance as to how privileges
are to be determined and implemented under Rule 501. As one commen-
tator noted, while they "do not have the force of law, they do provide
standards reflective of the 'reason and experience' mentioned in Rule
501. ''162 One district court judge observed:
What more accurate expression of the principles of the common
law and of the application of reason and experience could exist
than a draft that was developed by a representative committee of
bench, bar and scholars, twice published and commented on by the
bench and bar, adopted by the Judicial Conference and finally for-
warded by the Supreme Court to Congress for promulgation.
163
In Liuzzo v. United States,'I" the same judge, Charles Joiner, applied pro-
posed Rule 509(e) as if it had been enacted. 165 The plaintiffs in Liuzzo
asserted that the government was liable for an FBI informant's participa-
tion in the killing of a civil rights worker. The United States claimed
privilege as to a relevant FBI report. The court said it would uphold the
privilege on the condition that a finding of liability be entered against the
government. The court found that the plaintiffs "have presented the
court with a case which is neither frivolous nor beyond belief." '166 Justi-
fying entry of a judgment for the plaintiffs, the court declared:
[T]his approach is appropriate in this type of case because it allows
plaintiffs to realize their goals-the award of money damages for
their losses-while not intruding on the internal processes of the
executive branch. Nor is the government unduly penalized by the
court's resolution of this issue.... When government claims the
right to refuse information as to its conduct on the theory that
harm would come to its efforts to protect society, that same society
can recompense plaintiffs for their injuries.
167
According to the court, if the government felt it could not reveal the
information, the only issue left to decide was whether "the plaintiffs are
'deprived of material evidence"' by the grant of the privilege.168 If so,
the court would follow the guidance of proposed Rule 509(e) and enter
mittee (Aug. 9, 1971), reprinted in 117 CONG. REc. 33,648, 33,651-53 (1971), cited in 2 D.
LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 950 (1985).
162. M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 308 (2d ed. 1986); see Citibank,
N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192 (8th Cir. 1981).
163. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 n.1 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aftd, 570
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978).
164. 508 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
165. Id at 939 n.14.
166. Id. at 940.
167. Id. at 940-41.
168. Id. at 941 (quoting proposed FED. R. EID. 509(e)).
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judgment of liability for plaintiffs, subject to proof of damages.169 In
dicta, the court acknowledged that such a result "may not be appropriate
in a 'state secrets' case,"' 1 70 but did not explain why defendants deprived
of material evidence on state secrets grounds would be any less entitled to
redress of their rights than ones denied such evidence on the basis of any
other privilege. 17 1 If the remedy would not compromise the privilege,
but merely guarantee redress for the plaintiffs "in the interest of justice,"
it should be irrelevant whether the claim of privilege is based on a mili-
tary secret or some other reason. Regardless of the basis for the privi-
lege, the government keeps its secret and the plaintiffs receive their due.
Admittedly, even under the abandoned Rule 509(e) procedure, relief for
the plaintiffs was not mandatory, but subject to "the interest of justice."
Nevertheless, if the "interest of justice" standard is to be more than an
excuse for endorsing government privilege claims, it must be closely con-
fined. This can be accomplished by the following set of procedures:
(1) If the government makes a proper and colorable claim of the
state secrets privilege, and the court also finds that the plaintiff can estab-
lish a prima facie claim of a right to relief for violation of a fundamental
right, the court should follow Judge Joiner's precedent in Liuzzo and give
the government a choice of accepting an appropriate sanction to compen-
sate the plaintiff for loss of the evidence or disclosing the evidence to
plaintiff under protective order.
172
(2) If the government discloses the evidence, the case might be dis-
posed of by summary judgment following an in camera hearing, when
necessary. If summary judgment is not warranted and a jury trial has
been demanded, the court could require a waiver of jury trial. 173 While
169. Id; cf. Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
170. Liuzzo, 508 F. Supp. at 941.
171. Commentators have relied on similar unexplained presumptions. See, eg., Zagel, The
State Secrets Privilege, 50 MINN. L. REv. 875 (1966). Zagel notes that even prior to proposed
Rule 509(e) a court could enter sanctions against the government for failure to produce the
information under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b), but then goes on to suggest that this
would "ordinarily" be inappropriate when a government defendant invokes a state-secrets
claim. Id. at 906-07.
172. In Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 975 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia asserted that in United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1
(1953), the Supreme Court "indicated that the assertion by the government of the state secrets
privilege [did] not compel the issuance by a court of any sanction whatsoever," and that the
Court had "implied that such sanctions, if ever appropriate in the state secrets context, are to
be used only infrequently." As explained above, however, Reynolds was a Tort Claims Act
case in which the government was "a defendant only on terms to which it ha[d] consented."
Id. at 12; see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
173. If a court can deny a trial altogether to protect national security, how can it be pre-
cluded from denying a jury trial? The plaintiff has the right to waive a jury trial rather than be
denied all relief; presumably the government would also prefer to do so in such cases. See
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in camera proceedings are inconsistent with our Constitution's commit-
ment to public trials,174 they are less of an intrusion upon constitutional
values than denial of a trial altogether.
(3) If sanctions are not feasible because of the nature of the case,
and the government claims that disclosure even under protective order
would intolerably burden national security interests, the government
would be allowed to prove its contention in the face of a strong presump-
tion against secret decisionmaking.
The third procedure is modeled on the stringent constitutional stan-
dard for issuance of prior restraints under the First Amendment. Like
prior restraints, secret judicial decisions involve the subordination of fun-
damental rights in order to protect government secrecy. As with prior
restraints, there must be a "heavy presumption against [the] constitu-
tional validity" of such secret decisionmaking, 175 with a narrow escape
hatch for those instances in which significant national security interests
would truly be jeopardized. While a majority of the Supreme Court has
never clearly defined that standard, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion
in the Pentagon Papers case declared that issuance of such a prior re-
straint required "governmental allegation and proof that publication
must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea
. "... 176 Two other members of the Court endorsed a similar standard:
the disclosure must "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
Note, Keeping Secrets From the Jury: New Options for Safeguarding State Secrets, 47 FORD-
HAM L. lEv. 94, 98 (1978). Several reported cases have required nonjury trials under such
circumstances. Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1977), was a
contract action pertaining to classified equipment produced for the Air Force. The court held
that the litigants had effectively waived their rights to jury trial through their contractual
provision to preserve the confidentiality of the classified material and proceeded to conduct a
bench trial in camera. Id. at 1132. Halpern v. United States, 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958), was a
suit under the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-188, by an inventor to recover
damages suffered as a result of an order of secrecy imposed on his military patent. The court
held that a suit brought under the Act may be resolved by an in camera, nonjury trial. Hal-
pern, 258 F.2d at 43. The court observed: "It should not be difficult to obtain a court reporter
and other essential court personnel with the necessary security clearance," and that security
could be further maintained by keeping witnesses sequestered. Id.
174. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
175. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (quoting Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)); cf. In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 194 n.43 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) ("Since protective orders pursuant to Rule 26(c) pose dangers similar to other prior
restraints, they should not be entered without the necessary 'procedural safeguards designed to
obviate the dangers of a censorship system.' ") (citation omitted).
176. New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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damage to our Nation or its people." 177 Because two other members of
the Court were unwilling to permit any prior restraints whatsoever,
178
the Brennan-Stewart views provide the strongest guidance insofar as
prior restraints are concerned. There is no reason to demand a different
standard for disclosure of classified information at an in camera hearing.
When a prior restraint is denied, public disclosure of the sensitive infor-
mation is inevitable, whereas an in camera hearing under protective or-
der provides reasonable assurance that disclosure will go no further than
a member of the bar in good standing.
Although government attorneys will undoubtedly complain that
they ought not be put to such a choice, such objections are not convinc-
ing. Except in the rarest of situations,17 9 the risk posed by revealing even
legitimately privileged information to a member of the bar in good stand-
ing under protective order is remote indeed. An attorney who violated
such a protective order would face not only immediate contempt sanc-
tions but probable disbarment, and might also be subject to criminal
prosecution for disclosure of classified information. 18 0
Although the concept of adversarial in camera proceedings is not
supported by substantial case law, it has on occasion been recognized as a
viable option. The Second Circuit suggested it in Halpern v. United
States,"' a suit brought under the Invention Secrecy Act. 8 2 The court
instructed the district court to hold an in camera trial "if in its opinion
such a proceeding can be held without running any serious risk of divul-
gence of military secrets."1"3 The court noted that the scope of the state
secrets privilege "'is limited by its underlying purpose' "1184 and, there-
fore, is inapplicable "when disclosure to court personnel in an in camera
proceeding will not make the information public or endanger the na-
tional security." ' 5 Noting that a court has authority to take measures to
protect against disclosure of litigation material, the Fourth Circuit com-
mented that dismissal of an action is warranted only when "no amount
of effort and care on the part of the court and the parties will safeguard
177. Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., concurring).
178. See id. at 714 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring).
179. Two such situations are the disclosure of the sailing dates of transports, which was
mentioned in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), or the disclosure of the name of an
undercover agent whose safety would be put at risk.
180. 18 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988); see New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 733-37 (White, J.,
concurring).
181. 258 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1958).
182. See supra note 173.
183. Halpern, 258 F.2d at 43.
184. Id. at 44 (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60 (1957)).
185. Id.
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privileged material." 186
In Alderman v. United States,"8 7 the Supreme Court acknowledged
the possibility of disclosing privileged information in camera under pro-
tective order: "the trial court can and should, where appropriate, place a
defendant and his counsel under enforceable orders against [the] unwar-
ranted disclosure of the materials which they may be entitled to in-
spect."188 Courts have held that, when necessary, disclosure can be
limited to the attorney under an order not to reveal the privileged infor-
mation to the client. 189
While the risk to the government under the proposed procedures
would be remote, the benefit to a system of justice would be immeasura-
ble."9 Even if the plaintiff were not personally permitted access to the
privileged information, the participation of his or her advocate in the
decisionmaking process would provide a measure of reassurance that jus-
tice had indeed been done.191
The facts in both Molerio192 and Patterson193 indicate the insubstan-
tiality of potential government objections to the procedure proposed by
this Article. In Molerio, the worst that would have happened, from the
FBI's perspective, was that plaintiff's attorney would have been permit-
ted access, under protective order, to an FBI memo explaining the al-
leged actual reasons for his denial of employment. The attorney could
have determined if the secret memo provided justification for the defend-
ant's actions or was a sham excuse for political discrimination. In the
186. Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1244 (4th Cir. 1985).
187. 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (discussing examination of sensitive wiretap logs to determine
whether illegal interceptions had tainted the prosecution).
188. Id. at 185; accord United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 324
(1972); cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 n.21 (1974).
189. United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 667 F.2d 1105, 1107-08 (4th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982). In Loral Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 558 F.2d 1130,
1132 (2d Cir. 1977), the Second Circuit suggested the possibility of the attorneys' obtaining
security clearance. A similar suggestion was made in Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635
F.2d 268, 276 (4th Cir. 1980). Such a procedure seems neither feasible nor necessary.
190. While the Supreme Court has been extremely protective of late of the executive
branch's authority to control access to classified information, see Department of the Navy v.
Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988), it has not directly confronted the issue in the context now being
discussed: denial of the right to sue for violation of a fundamental right. Cf. Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988) ("the District Court has the latitude to control any discovery process
which may be instituted so as to balance respondent's need for access to proof which would
support a colorable constitutional claim against the extraordinary needs of the CIA for confi-
dentiality and the protection of its methods, sources, and mission").
191. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (comment of Justice Frankfurter).
192. Molerio v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see supra
notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
193. Patterson v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 893 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1990), affig 705 F.
Supp. 1033 (D.N.J. 1989); see supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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alternative, the FBI would have been able to buy its way out of sharing
the privileged document by compensating plaintiff for denial of a job.
In Patterson, plaintiff sought an order of expungement and statutory
damages under his Privacy Act claim. The court denied relief on the
ground that its ex parte examination of material submitted by the FBI
overcame plaintiff's prima facie case that maintenance of information
describing his exercise of first amendment rights was not pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.194 Under the
procedure suggested in this Article, unless the government could submit
evidence justifying a judicial finding that disclosure of the government's
information would result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage,
the government would have two choices, neither of which would likely
threaten national security: either give plaintiff the relief requested or
share the privileged information with plaintiff's attorney in an in camera
hearing. Secret decisionmaking is far more threatening to the fabric of
our constitutional democracy than either of these possible alternatives.
VIII. Postscript: The Politics of National Security
It should be no great surprise to any relatively astute and sophisti-
cated observer of current affairs that the doctrine of government open-
ness exemplified by cases like Alderman v. United States,19 Jencks v.
United States,196 and Dennis v. United States97 has fared poorly in the
post-Warren Court years, a time during which the White House has been
dominated by Presidents committed to the appointment to the federal
bench of judges sympathetic to authoritarian notions. If any issue has
divided liberal jurisprudents from their conservative counterparts in re-
cent years, it has been the issue of national security versus open govern-
ment.198 It has been a recurrent issue on the legal/political agenda since
the days of Joe McCarthy and the post-World War II loyalty
investigations. 199
194. Patterson, 705 F. Supp. at 1044.
195. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
196. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
197. 384 U.S. 855 (1966).
198. See Central Intelligence Agency v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985), discussed in Note, A
Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
409 (1986); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980);
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); United States v. New York
Times Co., 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (Pentagon Papers case).
199. See, eg., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Cafeteria Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
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The anti-Vietnam War movement, the Watergate scandal, and the
exposure of J. Edgar Hoover's misuse of the FBI as a political police
force helped temporarily to inspire a new spirit of openness in the land
that resulted in, among other things, the enactment of the Freedom of
Information Act and the Privacy Act in the first half of the 1970s. A
political swing to the right, the escalation of the Cold War, the recapture
of the White House by conservative forces in 1980, and the appointment
of hundreds of conservative Republican judges to the federal bench
brought notions of executive privilege and government secrecy back into
full favor. It is not surprising that the Molerio opinion, for the first time
sanctioning secret decisionmaking, is a product of the 1980s or that its
author is Antonin Scalia, a guru of the legal conservative movement. It
is no more surprising that the decision in Kinoy v. Mitchell-20 was written
by a veteran civil rights crusader, both off and on the bench, Constance
Baker Motley.
This history does not bode well for advocates who would erode the
government's national security privilege at a time when the conservative
judicial revolt has taken firm command of the Supreme Court and the
federal judiciary. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that the
Court's rulings on national security issues have been largely shaped by
the cold war ideology to which conservative Republicans have been wed-
ded for the past forty years. Perestroika, glasnost, and the rapid evapora-
tion of the Red Menace would seem to afford an ideal backdrop for a
fresh look at the legal doctrines constructed to protect Cold War political
strategies, just as the demise of the Yellow Peril permitted judicial of-
ficers who had taken an oath to uphold the Constitution to reconsider
doctrine, generated out of the needs and fears of World War II, that had
permitted incarceration of large groups of American citizens solely on
the basis of their ethnic origin.
20 1
At a time when Americans of all political persuasions hail the dar-
ing and courage of East European democrats who invade secret police
headquarters and destroy surveillance files from Bucharest to Prague and
East Berlin, is it really so unthinkable that our own Supreme Court
might take a fresh look at the scope of the national security privilege
under a Constitution that we have long esteemed for its protection of
individual liberty?
200. 67 F.R.D. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); see supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
201. Compare Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), with Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987),
and Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984); see Bishop, Day of
Apology and 'Sigh of Relief" N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1988, at A16, col. 2.

